

THE MEN IN THE DUGOUT: THE MANAGERS

Vin Scully, on the flap of the dust jacket for Leonard Koppett's 1993 book *The Man in the Dugout*, praised the author by saying, "If there would be a degree in baseball, Leonard Koppett would be a professor."

True enough. The late, great Koppett was certainly a professor of the National Pastime, and he was writing about men who had hard-earned Ph.D.'s in the game. The men in the dugout are perhaps the least understood of the important "players" in the game today. Manager's roles have changed greatly in recent decades; partly because of the prominence of millionaire superstars, but mostly due to the increasingly visible intrusion of the business of baseball into the game on the field.

In the early days, baseball was not nearly as studied a tactical game as it would later become and, when players did get "scientific," it was usually in the heat of battle rather than in any planned fashion. At this time, a manager's job involved mostly keeping his players under contract, on-time, on the train, and out of the bars. Players generally knew their roles, particularly in the days where regulars, including pitchers, played nearly every game.

Many of the great early managers—such as Cap Anson, Harry Wright, John Ward, and Charlie Comiskey—were thought of not only as leaders of men but also as particularly brainy players and sharp businessmen.

As baseball became more specialized in the 1890s, different managerial skills came into vogue. Managers began to make more of the decisions to bunt, steal, and the like, instead of letting the players play as they thought best. Furthermore, while teams always had a need to find and evaluate talent, the reserve clause now forced clubs to look into the "minor" leagues for new players. Well-traveled players and former players, who knew many different leagues, became especially valuable. Many of them—such as Hughie Jennings, John McGraw, and Wilbert Robinson—ended up as longtime managers.

In the 1890s, approximately half of managers were playing managers. Their experience on the field also helped these men manage ballplayers. Even at this time, rarely could a skipper become "one of the boys." Managers have long been expected to keep a fair distance from their players, because—as Sparky Anderson would comment many years later—"You take a guy out for a pinch hitter, he ain't gonna be your friend."

Most of the best managers—Joe McCarthy, Casey Stengel, Ned Hanlon, Frank Selee, Connie Mack, John McGraw, Earl Weaver, Walter Alston, Bill McKechnie, and others—respected their players and tried to treat them fairly, even if they weren't necessarily nice people to be around. Many of the greatest managers, especially in the early days, were also great teachers who showed younger men how to play the game as well as how to conduct their lives.

True renegades (e.g., Leo Durocher, Billy Martin, and Paul Richards) were impetuous, conniving, and often devious or deceitful. While many of their players didn't like them, the results were often positive—at least in the short term.

By the 1910s, managers were required to be better tacticians, not just shepherds of hard-bitten players. Relief pitchers, pinch hitters, and even platooning had come into use. As managing became more involved, fewer players were thought to be able to simultaneously handle the increased responsibility.

When the power era began in the 1920s, many a manager found himself less able to influence the game through tactical decisions and instead had to configure his lineup and rotation to provide the best offense and the most reliable pitching. Moreover, most managers were no longer the locus of player procurement. Clubs were now using general managers and, as a result, much of the personnel decisions were now out of the field manager's hands. The field manager also didn't necessarily control the salaries or the contracts of his players, taking away much of his power.

Managers ever since have had to deal with open revolt, dissension, and disobedience while maintaining order amidst changing social mores. Player salaries began to rise in the 1930s, and star players soon made as much as or more money than the manager. How, then, to keep the respect of the players? The more successful and famous managers of the 1940s—Lou Boudreau, Leo Durocher, and Billy Southworth, for example—would have expressed very different opinions.

Increasing expectations of success during the postwar boom also meant that managers were being fired more often. Some of the most successful managers of the 1950s—Casey Stengel, Chuck Dressen,

Charlie Grimm, and Fred Haney—lost their jobs when things got rocky.

Stengel, Al Lopez, and Walter Alston were tremendous managers, and all had different ways of winning. Lopez was largely focused on power and starting pitching, while Stengel kept the entire roster involved and always had strong defensive teams. The unflappable Alston used one-run offensive strategies and depended heavily on pitching, defense and, later, Dodger Stadium to keep opponents from scoring.

The success of the quiet, dignified Lopez and Alston was not lost among managers of the 1960s, who generally became less confrontational (with exceptions like Durocher and Alvin Dark). Most of the top managers of that time—Alston, Red Schoendienst, Ralph Houk, Gil Hodges—met this standard. However, highly qualified "Nervous Nellies"—tough, involved guys like Gene Mauch, Harry Walker, Dick Williams, and Dave Bristol—also enjoyed success, usually when brought in to turn around underachieving teams with fire and brimstone.

Free agency in the late 1970s meant even more challenges for managers trying to keep their highly paid and mobile stars in line. The kindly old man in the dugout was largely a character of the past. Instead, tough little guys—firebrands like Williams, Sparky Anderson, Earl Weaver, Billy Martin, and Whitey Herzog—became the game's top skippers in the 1970s and early 1980s. Much of their success came from a lack of fear of using untested players. The successful skippers of the era were never big stars; some had never even reached the majors. Therefore, they knew—as did Joe McCarthy, John McGraw, and Connie Mack before them—that plenty of talent was trapped in the minor leagues, just waiting to be given a chance.

By the 1980s and 1990s, the best managers had learned that lesson as a new type of manager evolved. True; there were some tough guys, like in the 1970s, but they were also more "nice guys." The *personalities* of winners like Tony La Russa, Tommy Lasorda, Bobby Cox, Jim Leyland, and Davey Johnson were very different. What they had in common, though, was an ability to keep a lid on the clubhouse full of millionaire players and million-dollar egos.

Keeping clubhouse dissension and other "private matters" out of the public eye became an important mark of most successful teams. Baseball people now saw the media as even more of an enemy, largely because the rise in salaries had caused a rift between the press and the players, and because the media was working harder to break juicy stories rather than just report the games. Modern managers were able to get their players to buy into the team concept. Different managers did this in various ways, either through enthusiastic positive reinforcement, a caring demeanor, or simply excellent personnel management. Many teams continued to hire the older "pepperpot" type of manager, though few of them were now successful.

Today's managers must balance the skills and egos of their players, the omnipresence of the media, and their relationship with the front office to succeed on the field—but they have to do it with a decreasing amount of perceived authority. The contemporary game's ever-changing finances mean that few managers can count on a consistently high payroll. It's a tough job to do, and the most successful managers of today—such as Cox, La Russa, Dusty Baker, Lou Piniella, and Joe Torre—do it through by earning respect and building consensus.

This Manager Register includes everyone who has ever managed a major league baseball team, from 1871 to the present, from the National Association to the Federal League to the American League, from Bill Adair to Ted Turner to Don Zimmer. Identifying managers, however, has not always been so obvious as it would seem, so there are some important things to note about this section.

First, a quick tongue-twister: A manager has to have managed to be listed as a manager, but he doesn't have to have been called a manager to have managed. In the early days of baseball history, the term "team manager" did not mean what it does now. Then, the person called the manager was what would now be called a general manager or a vice president. If those official team manager's duties did not include traveling with the club, making out the lineups, deciding when to change pitchers, arguing with the umpires, and the like, then this register does not include him. The "real" field manager of the team back then may have been the team captain; if so, this register will show him as the manager regardless of his title. This is a record of

those who did the job of a baseball manager, not those who had the title of manager.

Sometimes baseball managers have been referred to as coaches, as they are in other sports. The most famous recent example comes from P.K. Wrigley's rotating "College of Coaches" that ran the Cubs for five seasons during the 1960s. In that case, the coach referred to as head coach by the team is listed herein as the Cubs' manager for the period he was head coach.

Managers do not necessarily manage every single game in a season, of course. Managers are human beings, and they do occasionally miss a few games when they fall ill, get suspended, or attend to their families. In those cases, the coach left in charge does not become the manager in any real sense. Though the coach may make the moves, he is in most cases simply carrying out the manager's wishes.

When a long absence occurs, however, the situation gets muddier. This section uses a reasonable, though admittedly arbitrary, requirement of 30 consecutive days of managing the team in these cases for a substitute to qualify as the *de facto* manager.

When a manager is fired, however, the situation requires a different standard. When the manager's position is left vacant for any reason, the interim manager *is* definitely in charge. Thus, even if his managerial career lasts but one day, he is considered to have been a manager.

This register shows the date of birth for all managers, plus full biographical information for managers who were not major leaguer players (and are, therefore, not listed in the batter or pitcher registers). Managers who never played professional baseball are shown with a "DNP" code (Did Not Play). If a manager played in the minors but not in the majors, his primary position is showed in parentheses.

For each manager, the register shows the team(s) he managed in each season, along with that team's won-lost record and winning percentage during when he was manager. A lowercase e, w, or c after the league code indicates the team's division (East, West, or Central, respectively) from 1969–present. Player-managers are indicated by boldface years in the first column. Further information is available under the following headings:

The **Mgr/Yr** column gives results for clubs with multiple managers in a single season. If the team had more than one manager in the season listed, two numbers are shown, separated by a slash. In these

cases, the second number indicates how many managers the team employed that season, and the first number indicating which of these the listed manager was. For example, Jack McKeon is listed in 2003 as 2/2, because he was the second of two managers for the Florida Marlins.

The **Finish** column indicates how the team did under that manager. For managers who guided the team all season, the number gives the team's standing at year's end. If manager B took over from manager A *during* the season, the first number indicates the team's standing when manager B took over, and the second number the team's standing at the end of the season. Three or more managers in one season for a team would produce a three-number entry for the manager(s) in the middle: the team's standing before, during, and after said manager was running the club.

Symbols after the finish show if the team that finished first won any postseason series. A solid star (★) indicates the team won the World Series (including the NL-AA World Series in the nineteenth century). A solid diamond (◆) indicates the team won their LCS but lost the World Series (1969–present). A solid bullet (●) indicates a team won the NL championship in the 1890s (i.e., the 1892 series between the first- and second-place teams, the 1894–97 Temple Cup, or the 1900 *Chronicle-Telegraph* Cup). A hollow star (☆) indicates the team won a Division Series but lost in their LCS (1995–present). A cross (✚) indicates a Wild Card team. A solid triangle (▲) indicates the team was tied at the end of the regular season for first place or the Wild Card and played a one-game or three-game playoff. A t after the finish indicates a tie in the standings below first place (e.g., 4t means the team tied for fourth place that year).

The plus/minus column (+/-) indicates how many games the team won compared to how many the team was projected to win based on its run production. In other words, a 6.5 rating for a manager for a season indicates that his team won 6½ games more than could have been expected. A rating below zero indicates a disappointing performance, worse than expected given the team's runs scored and allowed.

On the career line, the manager's lifetime won-lost record and winning percentage are shown along with the number of seasons he managed and how many games his teams won compared to their projections.

THE MEN IN THE DUGOUT: THE MANAGER REGISTER

YEAR	TM LG	W	L	PCT	FINISH	MGR/YR	+/-
ACTA, MANNY Manuel Elias (Pena); B1.11.1969 San Pedro De Macoris, D.R.; BR/TR/6'2"/205(2B)							
2007	Was N e	73	89	.451	4	—	3.0
ADAIR, BILL Marion Danne; B2.10.1913 Mobile, AL; D6.17.2002 Bay Minette, AL BR/TR/5'8"/190(2B)							
1970	Chi A w	4	6	.400	6-6-6	2/3	0.2
ADCOCK, JOE B10.30.1927							
1967	Cle A	75	87	.463	8	—	0.0
ADDY, BOB B2.18.1845							
1875	Phi NA	3	4	.429	4-5	2/2	-1.3
1877	Cin N	5	19	.208	6-6-6	2/3	-0.3
Total 2		8	23	.258	—	—	-1.6
ALLEN, BOB B7.10.1867							
1890	Phi N	25	10	.714	3-2-3	4/5	4.8
1900	Cin N	62	77	.446	7	—	-3.5
Total 2		87	87	.500	—	—	1.2
ALLISON, ANDY B18.48							
1872	Eck NA	0	11	.000	10-9	1/3	1.2
ALLISON, DOUG B7.12.1846							
1873	Res NA	2	21	.087	8	—	5.0
ALOU, FELIPE B5.12.1935							
1992	Mon N e	70	55	.560	4-2	2/2	1.9
1993	Mon N e	94	68	.580	2	—	7.9
1994	Mon N e	74	40	.649	1	—	4.0
1995	Mon N e	66	78	.458	5	—	-4.3
1996	Mon N e	88	74	.543	2	—	-0.4
1997	Mon N e	78	84	.481	4	—	1.9
1998	Mon N e	65	97	.401	4	—	-1.9
1999	Mon N e	68	94	.420	4	—	0.0
2000	Mon N e	67	95	.414	4	—	1.5
2001	Mon N e	21	33	.389	5-5	1/2	-1.3
2003	SF N w	100	61	.621	1	—	7.6
2004	SF N w	91	71	.562	2	—	2.4
2005	SF N w	75	87	.463	3	—	3.8
2006	SF N w	76	85	.472	3	—	-0.2
Total 14		1033	1022	.503	—	—	22.8
ALSTON, WALTER B12.1.1911							
1954	Bro N	92	62	.597	2	—	11.4
1955	Bro N	98	55	.641	1★	—	1.6
1956	Bro N	93	61	.604	1	—	3.8
1957	Bro N	84	70	.545	3	—	-3.3
1958	LA N	71	83	.461	7	—	3.2
1959	LA N	88	68	.564	1▲★	—	6.5
1960	LA N	82	72	.532	4	—	-2.3
1961	LA N	89	65	.578	2	—	8.3
1962	LA N	102	63	.618	2▲	—	5.3
1963	LA N	99	63	.611	1★	—	8.0
1964	LA N	80	82	.494	6†	—	-5.7
1965	LA N	97	65	.599	1★	—	6.1
1966	LA N	95	67	.586	1	—	0.6
1967	LA N	73	89	.451	8	—	0.7
1968	LA N	76	86	.469	7†	—	-0.2
1969	LA N w	85	77	.525	4	—	-5.2
1970	LA N w	87	74	.540	2	—	-0.0
1971	LA N w	89	73	.549	2	—	-0.2
1972	LA N w	85	70	.548	3	—	1.1
1973	LA N w	95	66	.590	2	—	2.6
1974	LA N w	102	60	.630	1◆	—	-3.6
1975	LA N w	88	74	.543	2	—	-5.7
1976	LA N w	90	68	.570	2-2	1/2	3.9
Total 23		2040	1613	.558	—	—	36.8
ALTOBELLI, JOE B5.26.1932							
1977	SF N w	75	87	.463	4	—	-2.1
1978	SF N w	89	73	.549	3	—	5.9
1979	SF N w	61	79	.436	4-4	1/2	-2.1
1983	Bal A e	98	64	.605	1★	—	2.3
1984	Bal A e	85	77	.525	5	—	2.5
1985	Bal A e	29	26	.527	4-4	1/3	-0.3
1991	Chi N e	0	1	.000	4-5-4	2/3	-0.5
Total 7		437	407	.518	—	—	5.8
AMALFITANO, JOEY B1.23.1934							
1979	Chi N e	2	5	.286	5-5	2/2	-1.5
1980	Chi N e	26	46	.361	6-6	2/2	-4.7
1981-1	Chi N e	15	37	.288	6	—	-1.5
1981-2	Chi N e	23	28	.451	5	—	-1.5
Total 3		66	116	.363	—	—	-9.3
ANDERSON, SPARKY B2.22.1934							
1970	Cin N w	102	60	.630	1◆	—	11.6
1971	Cin N w	79	83	.488	4†	—	-2.6
1972	Cin N w	95	59	.617	1◆	—	2.3
1973	Cin N w	99	63	.611	1	—	5.6
1974	Cin N w	98	64	.605	2	—	2.2
1975	Cin N w	108	54	.667	1★	—	1.3
1976	Cin N w	102	60	.630	1★	—	-1.2
1977	Cin N w	88	74	.543	2	—	-0.5
1978	Cin N w	92	69	.571	2	—	9.3
1979	Det A e	56	50	.528	5-5	3/3	0.9
1980	Det A e	84	78	.519	5	—	-4.0
1981-1	Det A e	31	26	.544	4	—	3.0
1981-2	Det A e	29	23	.558	2†	—	3.0
1982	Det A e	83	79	.512	4	—	-2.5
1983	Det A e	92	70	.568	2	—	0.0
1984	Det A e	104	58	.642	1★	—	4.5
1985	Det A e	84	77	.522	3	—	-0.6

YEAR	TM LG	W	L	PCT	FINISH	MGR/YR	+/-
1986	Det A e	87	75	.537	3	—	-2.2
1987	Det A e	98	64	.605	1	—	1.8
1988	Det A e	88	74	.543	2	—	2.3
1989	Det A e	59	103	.364	7	—	-1.9
1990	Det A e	79	83	.488	3	—	-1.6
1991	Det A e	84	78	.519	2†	—	0.8
1992	Det A e	75	87	.463	6	—	-5.7
1993	Det A e	85	77	.525	3†	—	-1.7
1994	Det A e	53	62	.461	5	—	-2.8
1995	Det A e	60	84	.417	4	—	5.7
Total 26		2194	1834	.545	—	—	26.9
ANSON, CAP B4.17.1852							
1875	Ath NA	4	2	.667	2-2	2/2	-0.9
1879	Chi N	41	21	.661	2-4	1/2	8.1
1880	Chi N	67	17	.798	1	—	4.0
1881	Chi N	56	28	.667	1	—	-1.3
1882	Chi N	55	29	.655	1	—	-9.3
1883	Chi N	59	39	.602	2	—	-1.8
1884	Chi N	62	50	.554	4†	—	-9.5
1885	Chi N	87	25	.777	1★	—	-1.1
1886	Chi N	90	34	.726	1	—	-2.5
1887	Chi N	71	50	.587	3	—	2.1
1888	Chi N	77	58	.570	2	—	2.5
1889	Chi N	67	65	.508	3	—	-3.5
1890	Chi N	84	53	.613	2	—	1.0
1891	Chi N	82	53	.607	2	—	5.4
1892-1	Chi N	31	39	.443	8	—	6.8
1892-2	Chi N	39	37	.513	7	—	6.8
1893	Chi N	56	71	.441	9	—	-3.8
1894	Chi N	57	75	.432	8	—	-7.2
1895	Chi N	72	58	.554	4	—	6.0
1896	Chi N	71	57	.555	5	—	6.1
1897	Chi N	59	73	.447	9	—	-1.7
1898	NY N	9	13	.409	6-7-7	2/3	-2.5
Total 21		1296	947	.578	—	—	3.6
APPLING, LUKE B4.2.1907							
1967	KC A	10	30	.250	10-10	2/2	-6.5
ARMOUR, BILL William Reginald; B9.3.1869 Homestead, PA; D12.2.1922 Minneapolis, MN (DNP)							
1902	Cle A	69	67	.507	5	—	-0.8
1903	Cle A	77	63	.550	3	—	0.9
1904	Cle A	86	65	.570	4	—	-7.8
1905	Det A	79	74	.516	3	—	12.8
1906	Det A	71	78	.477	6	—	5.3
Total 5		382	347	.524	—	—	10.4
ASPRONTE, KEN B3.22.1931							
1972	Cle A e	72	84	.462	5	—	-0.4
1973	Cle A e	71	91	.438	6	—	4.4
1974	Cle A e	77	85	.475	4	—	-0.7
Total 3		220	260	.458	—	—	3.3
AUSTIN, JIMMY B12.8.1879							
1913	SIL A	2	6	.250	7-7-8	2/3	-1.3
1918	SIL A	7	9	.438	6-6-5	2/3	-0.7
1923	SIL A	22	29	.431	3-5	2/2	-2.4
Total 3		31	44	.413	—	—	-4.5
BAKER, DEL B5.3.1892							
1933	Det A	2	0	1.000	5-5	2/2	1.0
1936	Det A	18	16	.529	3-4-2	2/3	0.0
1937	Det A	34	20	.630	3-3-2	2/5	4.1
1937	Det A	7	3	.700	2-2-2	4/5	1.5
1938	Det A	37	19	.661	5-4	2/2	6.8
1939	Det A	81	73	.526	5	—	-4.1
1940	Det A	90	64	.584	1	—	-2.9
1941	Det A	75	79	.487	4†	—	3.6
1942	Det A	73	81	.474	5	—	-4.2
1960	Bos A	2	5	.286	8-8-7	2/3	-1.0
Total 9		419	360	.538	—	—	4.7
BAKER, DUSTY B6.15.1949							
1993	SF N w	103	59	.636	2	—	4.7
1994	SF N w	55	60	.478	2	—	-2.9
1995	SF N w	67	77	.465	4	—	6.8
1996	SF N w	68	94	.420	4	—	-2.5
1997	SF N w	90	72	.556	1	—	9.9
1998	SF N w	89	74	.546	2▲	—	-2.7
1999	SF N w	86	76	.531	2	—	1.2
2000	SF N w	97	65	.599	1	—	-0.6
2001	SF N w	90	72	.556	2	—	4.0
2002	SF N w	95	66	.590	2◆	—	-2.6
2003	Chi N c	88	74	.543	1★	—	2.8
2004	Chi N c	89	73	.549			